[PATCH] refactor correct_password.c to avoid one #if
walter harms
wharms at bfs.de
Tue Jul 31 16:08:15 UTC 2012
compile tested,
refactor correct_password.c to avoid one #if
Signed-off-by: wharms <wharms at bfs.de>
---
libbb/correct_password.c | 9 +++------
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libbb/correct_password.c b/libbb/correct_password.c
index 6301589..7cabd33 100644
--- a/libbb/correct_password.c
+++ b/libbb/correct_password.c
@@ -41,12 +41,6 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
char *unencrypted, *encrypted;
const char *correct;
int r;
-#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
- /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
- struct spwd spw;
- char buffer[256];
-#endif
-
/* fake salt. crypt() can choke otherwise. */
correct = "aa";
if (!pw) {
@@ -55,7 +49,10 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
}
correct = pw->pw_passwd;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+ /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
if ((correct[0] == 'x' || correct[0] == '*') && !correct[1]) {
+ struct spwd spw;
+ char buffer[256];
/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
* At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
struct spwd *result = NULL;
--
1.6.0.2
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