[Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] package infra: add mirror support
thomas.petazzoni at free-electrons.com
Wed Oct 19 12:59:34 UTC 2011
Le Wed, 19 Oct 2011 11:35:52 +0200,
Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout at mind.be> a écrit :
> The recent kernel.org horror has convinced me that some form of
> verification is needed, though.
Having hashes in Buildroot will not necessarily provide an additional
security. Consider the following scenario:
1. The world exists.
2. Project foo releases foo-2.1.tar.bz2
3. A BR packager bumps package foo to 2.1. He downloads the new
tarball, generates locally its hash and adds this hash to the
4. The BR packager patch is merged in Buildroot.
Having hashes in the foo.mk will warn you if the foo website has been
cracked after step 3. But if it has been cracked between 2) and 3),
then you're doomed: the BR packager will assume foo-2.1.tar.bz2 is
correct. This packager will quite probably never check a GPG signature
or do any kind of additional security check when bumping foo to 2.1.
Therefore, I fear that this mechanism would give an *impression* of
higher security, but would in fact provide no additional security
compared to not verifying the hashes.
Thomas Petazzoni, Free Electrons
Kernel, drivers, real-time and embedded Linux
development, consulting, training and support.
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